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ABSTRACT (99 WORDS) 
Interorganizational information systems are information systems that cross 
organizational boundaries. Information managers and system developers often assume 
that the more integrated these information systems are, the more successful the system 
will be. Such an assumption is indeed intuitively appealing, and, from a technological 
standpoint, readily understandable. In practice, development and use of integrated 
information systems that cross organizational boundaries often result in confusing 
power struggles, politicking and sometimes manifest sabotage. Based on economic 
and political organization theory, this article concludes that data ownership and 
incentives, rather than integration, are of vital importance for the success of 
interorganizational information systems.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent trends like e-commerce, e-business and e-government challenge organizations 
to use information- and communication technologies to exchange knowledge and 
information and to collaborate with other organizations. By applying 
telecommunication networks, it is possible for organizations to open up their 
processes to suppliers, customers, and other business partners (Bakos and Nault, 
1997).  
Examples of such forms of electronic collaboration are to be found in the automotive 
industry (Reekers and Smithson, 1996), banking and insurance sector (Toppen, 1999), 
logistics (Wierda, 1991; Kreuwels, 1994), health care (Beynon-Davies, 1994) and 
penal law enforcement (Grijpink, 1997; Bellamy, 1998).  
The information systems that are used to exchange information across organizational 
boundaries are often referred to as interorganizational information systems (Bakos, 
1991), by means of which so-called extended enterprises emerge (Konsynski, 1993). 
Very often, there is an assumption in information management theory that the more 
integrated the interorganizational information system is, the more successful the 
collaboration between the participating organizations will be (Benjamin, de Long and 
Scott Morton, 1990; Scott Morton, 1991; Cunningham and Tynan, 1993). Integration 
can be defined as the standardization of data definitions and data structures through 
the use of a common conceptual scheme across a collection of data sources (Goodhue, 
Wybo and Kirsch, 1992). Konsynski and McFarlan state that “information has to be 
packaged for all partners by all partners, which requires the joint design of data 
definitions, formats, relationships and search patterns” (1990, p. 119). Furthermore, 
Huang (1998) hypothesizes that the greatest benefits from interorganizational 
information systems are obtained when integration of computer applications is 
achieved over a network of organizations. A typical form of an integrated 
interorganizational information system is a centralized data base management system 
containing all the unequivocal, relevant data of the organizations participating in the 
network. However, integration can also be achieved using a number of dislocated 
database management systems whose operations are tightly coordinated through a 
common architecture.  
An example of an integrated interorganizational information system is TransLease 
(Allen, Colligan, Finnie and Kern, 1999), an electronic commerce system owned by 
Cap Gemini and used by a thousand British repair agents working for seven vehicle 
leasing and contract hire companies. TransLease uses standardized data formats 
throughout the network (which also enshrine the ‘rules of trade’) as the backbone of 
the system, in order to simplify the processing of auditing invoices.  
 
Empirical evidence shows that the reality of interorganizational information systems 
is not as easy and profitable as the optimistic ICT advocates would lead us to believe. 
In practice, the question which data model is to be used often gives rise to 
organizational-political struggle and ownership disputes, and shows that the 
development and use of interorganizational information systems are complex and 
intriguing processes in which political and economic forces play a role (Webster, 
1995; Kumar and van Dissel, 1996; see also Davenport, Eccles and Prusak, 1992; 
Knights and Murray, 1992; Elg and Johansson, 1997). Obviously, interorganizational 
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information systems needs to be understood as a manifestation of interorganizational 
relationships as well as from a technological standpoint.  
For instance, in the example of TransLease mentioned above, actual use of the system 
was far below expectations. An evaluation showed that the TransLease system did not 
provide the envisaged mutual benefits to its participants:  “[a] dominant theme for 
repair agent complaints was their perception of an ‘unfair’ balance of power, which 
meant they felt that lease companies would tie them into a system that would reinforce 
and amplify existing power structures” (Allen, Colligan, Finnie and Kern, 1999, p. 
10).  
This kind of case studies have inspired academics and practitioners to question the 
dominant and popular ICT visions and to ask how interorganizational information 
systems get along with the problems of data modeling and data maintenance and 
whether a maximum of integration of computer systems across organizational 
boundaries is possible at all, and more importantly, really to be strived for from a 
management point of view (Kubicek, 1995).  
In fact, there nowadays are initiatives where interorganizational information systems 
are designed with the explicit notion to preserve the participating organizations’ 
autonomy as much as possible. In the Dutch social security sector, a complex network 
of public, public-private and private organizations, operational data on clients is not 
registered in a central database but is dispersed over a conglomerate of decentralized 
databases, connected through a separately-owned referral index (Homburg, 1999). The 
theoretical underpinnings of these interorganizational information systems, however, 
are far from developed. Therefore, in this article, the emergence of organizational-
political struggle and ownership disputes in relation to interorganizational information 
systems is analyzed using economic and political organization theory and these 
theoretical insights are confronted with data from a case study of the development of 
interorganizational information systems in the Dutch research and development sector 
(comprising of universities and private research institutes). The outcomes of this study 
are especially relevant for information-intensive industries (banking and insurances, 
government, research & development) in which increasingly, information and 
communication technologies are used to share information and knowledge.  
 
The structure of this article is as follows. In section two, interorganizational 
information systems are described as information resources or information assets and 
various ownership structures of interorganizational information systems (and thus, as 
we will demonstrate, various levels of integration) will be described using political 
and economic organization theory. The third section provides a case studies of the 
development of interorganizational information systems in the Dutch research and 
development community. In the fourth and final section, conclusions are drawn, the 
limitations of this study are discussed and implications for research and practice of 
interorganizational information systems are stated. 
AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VIEW ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS  
INTRODUCTION 
In general, integration of information systems has much intuitive appeal from a 
technical point of view, as inconsistent data semantics (e.g., different definitions of 
performance criteria, product coding schemes and vendor purchase data) may 
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seriously obstruct workflows and day-to-day business operations in networks of 
cooperating organizations. However, even in relatively unitary organizations that were 
aware of the problems associated with inconsistent data semantics and had attempted 
data standardization, integration failed or the organization experienced major 
difficulties (Goodhue, Quillard and Rockart, 1988; Goodhue, Kirsch, Quillard and 
Wybo, 1992; Wybo and Goodhue, 1995; Shanks, 1997), for example because 
‘unwilling’ local managers refused to give up control over information systems.  
 
A POLITICAL VIEW ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
A political view (Davenport, Eccles and Prusak, 1992; Elg and Johansson, 1997) 
sheds some light on the background of the struggle surrounding interorganizational 
information systems (Webster, 1995; Holland, 1995; Klein, 1996; Kumar and van 
Dissel, 1996; Bensaou, 1997). In political organization theory, for example resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; see also Levine and White, 1961; 
Aldrich, 1976), organizations inhibit a complex world, in which many of the resources 
needed to attain their goals (including information and knowledge, client referrals, 
money, legal authority, political legitimacy, people and equipment) are controlled by 
other organizations. This means that, in practice, focal organizations enter into 
interorganizational relations with partner organizations (for instance, by using 
interorganizational information systems) in order to gain access to external resources. 
However, in doing this, they may have to comply with arrangements that may not be 
designed to suit them. Information handling procedures, terms of use and also data 
models may not always be geared to their requirements. In such a context, 
standardization of data models is certainly not a zero-sum game. According to 
political organization theory, each organization strives to optimize its self-interest by 
(1) minimizing their dependence on other organizations and (2) maximizing the 
dependence of other organizations on themselves (Reekers and Smithson, 1996). 
Standardization can be used as a strategy by powerful organizations to deliberately 
affect the dependence between organizations in a favorable way to them (Elg and 
Johansson, 1997). As Webster (1995) notes, standardization is an intensely political 
and adversarial process, because only the large and powerful parties can afford to get 
heavily involved in the standards development process. Truly joint design therefore is 
possibly a utopian ideal. As the less powerful parties are assumed to avoid further 
resource dependence, it is clear why standardization of data models is often forcefully 
resisted, if not the interorganizational information systems are in practice sabotaged.  
An example of this kind of behavior is provided by Beynon-Davies (1994). This 
author describes an attempt to develop a generalized model of healthcare data to be 
used in the British National Health Service (NHS), which can be characterized as a 
network of semi-autonomous organizations. However, despite large efforts the data 
model was never actually implemented. Although the development of the data model 
was originally portrayed as a neutral and technocratic exercise, the participating 
organizations very actively opposed the data model because they felt that the data 
model and especially the operational and financial data encompassed in the model, 
once implemented, could be used as a basis of comparison between NHS bodies. 
According to the semi-autonomous NHS bodies, the data model to be used to 
facilitate the exchange of information within the network thus raised unforeseen, 
partly unintended and very fundamental questions about accountability within the 
network of cooperating organizations (in this case, the NHS, Beynon-Davies (1994)).  
This suggestion has been confirmed in other studies. In a case study of a large, 
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diversified organization, Markus reported that there was a suspicion that 
standardization of data models was used to enhance control over relatively 
autonomous divisions for the reason of “ferreting out how the knaves were doing in 
the trenches” (1983, p. 437). In a study of the diffusion of electronic data interchange 
technologies, Webster identified situations in which powerful organizations “(…) 
unilaterally imposed their in-house computer systems or information handling 
procedures upon their trading partners, extending their own hardware systems into 
their supplier’s premises, dictating product and inventory coding according to their 
own established in-house information systems, and dictating the type and frequency of 
data to be exchanged” (1995, p. 37). Obviously, the view that networks of 
organizations can be regarded as structures containing mutual as well as conflicting 
interests (Elg and Johansson, 1997) also applies to the development and use of 
interorganizational information systems (Reekers and Smithson (1996) and Bensaou 
(1997)). 
 
Although political organization theory provides an explanation for the organization-
political struggle surrounding the development and use of interorganizational 
information systems, actors are usually less realistically depicted as aberrant managers 
or deviant technologists, focusing on political aspects, nurturing organizational 
autonomy and ignoring effectiveness and efficiency. The politicking in relation to 
interorganizational information systems, however, is capable of being understood in 
other ways, among other things in ways that also include aspects of efficiency. In 
order to show how a more sophisticated understanding could throw more light on the 
topics under investigation here, we discuss a body of knowledge complementary to 
political organization theory, namely economic organization theory (more specifically, 
property rights theory).  
 
AN ECONOMIC VIEW ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Property rights theory (Pejovich and Furubotn, 1973; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart 
and Moore, 1991) is an extension to standard neoclassical analysis. It provides an 
analysis of behavior of individuals with respect to assets (including information 
assets, Brynjolfsson (1994); Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1995); Bakos & 
Nault (1997)), under the assumption of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality refers 
to the impossibility to formalize all kinds of behavior in contracts that encompasses  
all future contingencies. Hence, property rights theory is also referred to as incomplete 
contracts theory. If we regard interorganizational information systems as information 
assets, it is possible to analyze behavior with respect to these kind of information 
systems with property rights theory.  
Property rights theory defines property rights as “(…) the sanctioned behavioral 
relations among men that arise from the existence of goods an that pertain to their use. 
These relations specify the norms of behavior with respect to goods that each and 
every person must observe in his daily interaction with other persons, or bear the cost 
of non-observance” (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974, p. 3). Hart and Moore (1990) 
furthermore state that a property right ultimately is the owner’s ability to exclude 
others from the use of his or her asset. More specifically, Furubotn and Pejovich 
discern three categories of property rights: usus, the right to use an asset, abusus, the 
right to reconstruct an asset, and usus fructus, the right to appropriate the returns from 
the asset.  
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If we regard an information system as an information asset, we see that full ownership 
of these assets involves the right to use an information system, to modify it with 
quality-enhancing or cost-saving features, and to appropriate the benefits of these 
adaptations. As an owner may exert the usus fructus property right, it has intensive 
incentives to perform well.  
One of the options an owner of an asset possesses is to allow others to use the assets 
in exchange for a compensation, specified in a contract between user and owner. In 
this situation property rights theory states that because of bounded rationality, there 
will always be ‘incompleteness’ of contracts, implying that there will always be 
residual rights not covered in a contract. The institution that allocates these residual 
rights of is ownership (Brynjolfsson, 1994) and hence, the owner is ‘residual 
claimant’. This situation occurs when in a network of organizations, one organization 
fully owns a central database while other organizations use it (that is, look in the 
database and/or enter information into the database) and contribute in the costs of the 
system through a agreed-upon lease contract. Such a separation of ownership and 
actual use has important consequences for the behavior with respect to information 
assets. Think of an employee who is working with an interorganizational information 
system that requires some specific investments from his side, for example 
participation in an on-the-job quality improvement training program. Such an 
employee faces intensive incentives to participate in such a program because in the 
long run, he can bargain for benefits in the form of a higher wage, promotion, more 
leisure time, et cetera. If we take the situation in which the system is owned by 
another organization, the marginal value of the participation of the employee in the 
program can be expected to be divided among employee, his boss and the owner of 
the system (as, in the bargaining process, the owner can exert hold-up power by 
threatening to withhold the asset). If the system were largely owned by his own 
organization, he can expect to receive a larger part of the marginal value in the 
bargaining process. Here we see that, in the absence of possibilities to formalize 
complicated reward schemes in contracts (e.g., assuming bounded rationality), a 
separation of ownership and control mitigates incentives. Van Alstyne et al (1994) 
characterize this situation with the phrase ‘rental cars are driven less carefully than 
cars driven by their owners’.  
This situation is different in a number of specific situations, namely if one of the 
participants is indispensable or if assets are complementary. Complementary assets 
are assets that are useless when used separate but represent value when used in 
conjunction. In these cases, the individual employee working with the asset is better 
off if property rights are dispersed among less participants (for an elaborate 
explanation and formalization of these mechanisms, refer to Goodman and Hart 
(1986), Hart and Moore (1991), Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1994) and  
Bakos and Nault (1997)) and the situation is characterized by more incentives to 
perform well for all employees, managers and asset owners involved.  
For the specific situation of interorganizational information systems, it is relevant that 
the ‘integration’ of interorganizational information system mentioned before confronts 
employees with an attenuation of property rights, and hence, their incentives to 
perform well are partly mitigated. According to Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and 
Madnick (1995), this mitigation of incentives results in subtle intangible costs of low 
effort which will eventually appear as distorted, missing, or unusable data. The line of 
reasoning can be summarized as follows: the more the sense of ‘ownership’ is 
diminished, the less intense incentives will be. Consequently, the level of investments 
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in the interorganizational information system will  typically be lower, which in its turn 
affects the functionality, profitability, and eventually the viability of the 
interorganizational information system (Bakos and Nault, 1997). Of course, this line 
of reasoning is only valid in the absence of indispensability and complementarity of 
assets. In these cases, incentives of participants are best served by concentrated 
ownership, favoring participants’ chances in ex-post bargaining processes.  
This property rights theory applied to information assets provides a line of reasoning 
and a view on human behavior possibly is a caricature (as political organization theory 
does), but perhaps not such an unrealistic one (Hart, 1995). And, combining economic 
organization theory and political organization theory (see the section below), it 
provides us with a conceptual framework which allows the understanding of the 
difficulties and especially politicking surrounding the development and use of 
interorganizational information systems.  
 
SUMMARY OF THE LINE OF REASONING  
In the introduction of this article, it has been mentioned that there is a widely held 
belief among system developers and information managers that the more integrated 
interorganizational information systems are, the larger the chance for success is. After 
reviewing both political organization theory and economic organization theory, it is 
clear that integration, defined as the standardization of data definitions and data 
structures through the use of a common conceptual scheme across a collection of data 
sources, also has a number of negative consequences. 
First, according to political organization theory, standardization of data definitions 
and data standards may be geared to the requirements of some organizations 
participating in an interorganizational information system, but not necessarily to the 
requirements of all organizations. Integration, according to political organization 
theory, may be used to enshrine interorganizational control and interorganizational 
surveillance in information technology (Webster, 1995). This is supposed to be 
contrary to an organization’s quest for autonomy.  
Second, according to economic organization theory, standardization of data 
definitions and data standards can be conceived as a mitigation of property rights with 
respect to the information system. Participants are less inclined to invest in the system 
and to enhance the information system with cost-saving or quality-enhancing features, 
and eventually such a diminishment of incentives results in less profitable, less 
functional and even less viable interorganizational information systems. According to 
Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1995), a typical symptom of lack of 
incentives is poor data quality, resulting from underinvestment in human and technical 
capital.  
In figure one, a political economy framework for the development and use of 
interorganizational information systems is presented. It assumes that if organizations 
want to preserve access to information resources, they want to avoid excessive 
resource dependence, underinvestment by any of the participating organizations’ 
members, and unintended interorganizational surveillance and control. In order to do 
this, an appropriate ownership structure and configuration of the interorganizational 
information system (in terms of economic property rights) must be decided upon.  
 
[[Figure one about here]] 
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Following the line of reasoning set out in the previous sections, we hypothesize that in 
the absence of indispensability and complementarity of information assets, 
organizations will opt for dis-integrated interorganizational information systems were 
possible, ensuring to exert property rights with respect to the interorganizational 
information systems (or parts of these) they are using. If we take the archetypes of the 
centralized database and the decentralized database with the referral index, we expect 
that cooperating organizations will prefer decentralized systems over centralized 
databases, which are fully ‘owned’ by one organization in a network of organizations 
that are using the system. This property theory-line of reasoning, as well as a political 
view on information resources, thus contradicts the intuitive logic indicating that 
integration is a necessary precondition of the success of an interorganizational 
information system and warrants other options than integration of these information 
systems.  
 
In order to investigate this hypothesis, in the following section, a case study is 
presented of  exchange of information through an interorganizational information 
system in the Dutch research community. Before moving on to this case study, a brief 
note on research methods is appropriate. The case study employs a qualitative and 
diverse set of methods including interviews with information managers, system 
developers, administrators and users of information systems, observations and 
document analysis. Although this article draws principally from the case study 
presented here, it was also informed by two other case studies in the Dutch social 
security and fiscal policy sector that were undertaken in the course of a larger research 
project. Finally, we would like to remark that statistical generalization is of course not 
applicable here. The case study presented here shows to illustrate and analytically 
generalize novel theoretical ideas (at the cornerstones of information management 
theory, political organization theory and economic organization theory) that may be 
applied in varying contexts.  
CASE STUDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 
BACKGROUND OF THE FIELD AND IMPORTANT STAKEHOLDERS 
As an introduction to the case study of the development and use of the NOD and 
CombiFormat interorganizational initiatives, first the policy and organizational 
background of the network under investigation is presented. In the Netherlands, an 
organizational network exists that consists of publicly or partly publicly financed 
research institutes. Traditionally, the Ministry of Education, or, more specifically, the 
Directorate of Higher Education and Scientific Research, is an important player in the 
field, who financially supports the research institutes and universities. The universities 
cooperate and participate in an interest association, the Association of Universities in 
the Netherlands (VSNU). The Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW) is the 
interest association of the other research institutes.  
Since a couple of years, the funding of institutes has taken a course from a hierarchical 
system in the direction of a market-oriented system, in which institutes have a greater 
amount of autonomy. Administrators of research institutes concern themselves with 
their market share instead of lobbying government officials or predisposing the 
Minister in favor of their plans (Gazendam & Homburg, 1996). Historically, the 
institutes were used to report (initially in paper form and later on in the form of 
 10
information systems) to a central registration owned by the Ministry. This implied that 
the Ministry requested information from the universities and research institutes and 
that the universities supplied the Ministry with the requested information. In fact, 
these information relations were, during the last few decades, stated in an information 
policy.  
In 1985, research administrators quite explicitly opposed this approach, probably 
inspired by the changes in legislation (especially the system of funding) that were 
announced in that year. In the years before 1985, the information was used against 
them in cutback operations and the institutes, especially the universities, feared that 
these cutback operations would continue, inspired by the information they supplied. 
During a discussion on information management organized by the interest association 
of the universities, an anonymous participant said: “(…) a couple of years ago, 
association measures were identified between input and output. Should we have the 
fox guard the chicken coup by means of automating our registrations?”. In this case, 
the interest association of the Dutch universities presented its own information policy 
proposals, to be used in the network of universities, research institutes, and 
government organizations. In 1990, it stated a number of information management 
principles, including that “the information exchanged should match the information 
requirements of the institutes themselves” (VSNU, 1996, p. 5). Furthermore, the 
importance of exchange through formal reports is stressed and it is argued that the 
number of reports should be minimized. Finally, it is stated that “(…) controllability 
has to be sought in simplification rather than in integration of overly complex 
information flows” (VSNU, 1996, p. 5) and it is stated that “(…) there is no need for 
new, government-owned, centralized registrations” (VSNU, 1996, p. 5).  
The ‘Information Conference’ of 1992 marked a change in the information 
management approach adopted for the exchange of information between research 
institutes and the Ministry of Education. The set of indicators used by the Ministry 
raised a lot of criticism. During the conference, the institutes agreed that they would 
be held accountable for their results based on a set of indicators, but they also 
managed to agree with the Ministry that the initiative for the formulation of these 
indicators would be primarily in the hands of the institutes and their associations (see 
also Bekkers, 1998). At the same time the institutes acknowledged that the Ministry 
needs this information. However, there is a problem about the desired level of 
aggregation of the information to be exchanged. Agreement was reached on an 
approach in which the information needs of the Ministry will more and more be 
satisfied by the use of indicators.  
Another very important result of the conference was that it was stated the Ministry of 
Education acknowledged that the information to be exchanged was owned by the 
research institutes (Bekkers, 1998).  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH INFORMATION SYSTEM 
A special topic in the exchange of information in the research community is the 
exchange of information on research activities. Registration of research activities was 
asked for in order to inform businesses, social organizations, international research 
organizations and government of the research projects that were being conducted by 
universities and research institutes. The importance of this kind of exposure of 
research activities, both nationally as well as internationally, is widely shared among 
the various participating organizations in the research community. 
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In order to accomplish this kind of exposure of research activities, in 1988, the NBOI 
was founded (this organization was renamed NIWI in 1997), among other things in 
order to design and develop a National Research Database (NOD), which was also to 
be owned and maintained by this organization. The Ministry assumed that with the 
establishment of the NOD, with which the research institutes in principle had agreed, 
the universities were obliged to submit research information to the NOD. The VSNU 
on the other hand, assumed that an obligation existed only if there was not a single 
trace of doubt as to (1) the method of submission of information and (2) what 
organizations should eventually receive the information. In practice, the association 
wanted to postpone its commitment to the agreement until the results of the expected 
evaluation of the NOD were available and until its own investigation of the possibility 
of  alternative approaches, in line with its own information policy statements, had 
been completed. The VSNU demanded complete freedom with respect to technical 
and organizational aspects, so that it is possible for them to align completely with 
their own information and management policies. In the mean time, there was a lot of 
quarrel over the question who should provide the research information and who 
should contribute to the costs of the NOD. The latter question proved to be especially 
important because the institutes felt they did not experience any benefits from the 
NOD. Furthermore, the universities stated that they “(…) are not fully convinced of 
the usefulness of the [NOD] (…).The academic institutes are apprehensive of putting 
research information, which is to be classified as ‘strategic’ and which consists of 
input and output data at specific aggregation levels, at the disposal of (potential) users 
without explicit permission. If it is not clear to what use the information is to be put, 
[the institutes] refuse to supply this information” (Ambtelijk Overleg Onderzoek, 
1990, p. 3). Another participant stated that  “(…) if the NOD is accessible 
unconditionally, government is, through the back door, allowed access to information 
that, given the position of government, has to be characterized as ‘management 
information’. Seen from the point of view of the universities, the supply of such an 
amount of management information is not acceptable”. In the proceedings of a 
discussion meeting, it is noted that there is a preference for a coordinating and 
referring function for the NIWI with respect to research information systems, and no 
need exists for a complete, central and uniform register with detailed information with 
respect to output of research activities.  
At the same time, it is noted that there are in practice problems with the day-to-day 
use of the NOD. Furthermore, a problem faced in the NOD initiative is that of the 
fourteen universities, only eight have a contract with the database owner for electronic 
data interchange, and the filling of the database in general falls short of expectations 
(Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997).  
 
In response to these developments, and, according to some stakeholders, out of sheer 
aggravation, the VSNU developed the CombiFormat data model, to be used as a basis 
for several research information systems, which are interconnected and separately 
owned by research institutes or groups of research institutes. In 1997, the 
CombiFormat was accepted and implemented by ten of the fourteen universities 
(Advantage, 1997), which had either developed a research information system (in 
Dutch: OZIS or OIS) themselves, or had bought an existing system which was 
developed by another research institute. Although the federation of OIS/OZIS systems 
technically resembled the NOD database (in terms of design methodology, database 
technology, et cetera), there was one crucial difference: the participating organizations 
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were explicitly granted ownership of their OIS or OZIS systems, which, for instance, 
allowed them to adapt and modify the underlying data model, and, more importantly, 
allowed the research institutes (being owners) ultimately to exclude access to their 
data in case there was a suspicion of use which had not been agreed upon on 
beforehand (e.g. in contingencies which had not been agreed upon in interchange 
agreements or other contracts with other research institutes, universities, the Ministry, 
NBOI/NIWI, et cetera).  
 
In the following period, two competing interorganizational information systems 
existed. However, nearly all stakeholders agreed that this situation of competing 
interorganizational information systems was not desirable and two expert opinions 
were asked for (Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad (1997) and consecutively, 
Advantage (1997)).  
In the experts’ reports, it is firstly noted that “if the parties involved do not succeed in 
increasing drastically the timeliness and coverage [of the NOD], it is not likely that a 
NOD-like structure will survive. And the former is a prerequisite for justifying the 
costs the NOD incurs” (Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997, p. 8). Furthermore, 
it is recommended to  gather and enter data at the source as much as possible 
(Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997). In both reports, the necessity of a central 
database is questioned. In the report of  Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad (1997), it 
is stated that possibly, over time, searches on decentral databases could be a satisfying 
solution. In the Advantage report, the following is stated: “[a]n important point of 
reference is that the organizations involved are highly autonomous. (…) The choice of 
a specific approach therefore has to take these relationships and mutual 
interdependencies into account. Here, the relationships between institutes and between 
institutes and NIWI are at stake. A combined bottom-up/top-down approach, in which 
all participants are taken into account, is preferred. (…) An incremental approach is to 
be preferred over a waterfall-like approach. (…) It is furthermore important to notice 
that the relationship between NIWI and the institutes is not self-evident. This 
relationship will have to be nourished on the basis of mutual value-added” (1997, pp. 
9-10). 
In general, both expert consultations result in support for the CombiFormat initiative 
and the OIS/OZIS systems over the NOD database. After a initial period of 
polarization, both the VSNU, research institutes and universities as well as the 
NBOI/NIWI support the conclusions of the experts. Even the Board of the Royal 
Dutch Academy of Sciences, under whose heading the NBOI/NIWI formally operates, 
stated that it did not exclude the possibility that, over a certain period of time, the 
alternative of decentralized data storage would predominate. They noticed that the 
core of the report implies a changed role of the NOD, with a more important role for 
the decentralized input of data by the institutes who are responsible for the research 
activities.  
 
Indeed the role of the NIWI changed from being a source of data (through the NOD), 
to an organization that focuses on quality assurance and the active (international) 
marketing of the research information owned by the research institutes and 
universities. Furthermore, the NOD itself as an information system is transferred from 
being a ‘pure’ data base to an information system with a variety of functions, of which 
the most important ones are the referral to OIS/OZIS system using a thesaurus of 
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search terms and indices. This is in accordance with the participating organizations’ 
preference for a coordinating and referring function for the NIWI.  
 
POLITICS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS OF NOD AND COMBIFORMAT 
The developments mentioned above, relating both of the tasks and mission of the 
NIWI organization, as well as with respect to the NOD information system, marks the 
trajectory for changes in the research community in the Netherlands. Parts of these 
changes have already been completed and other changes are yet to come. Important 
here is that all stakeholders agree that the centralized NOD system, fully owned by 
NIWI is not an option any more, and that the decentralized OIS/OZIS systems are a 
more viable option.  
In terms of political and economic organization theory, a number of remarks can be 
made. First of all, in terms of political organization theory, at least the research 
institutes and universities saw the establishment of the NOD as a sign of deliberate 
power use. More specifically, their fear was that the NOD could be used to gather 
management information which could be used for other, strategic purposes, than 
merely registration of research information for national and international exposure of 
research activities. In terms of economic organization theory, to the participating 
institutes, the NOD represented an information asset which elicited few incentives to 
invest scarce time and energy in. In fact, the signs of underinvestment were present: 
the NOD suffered from poor data quality by the fact that (1) not all institutes 
participated in the NOD and (2) the data that had been registered was timely nor 
accurate, and thus data quality was very poor.  
The initiative to develop an alternative interorganizational information system, 
undertaken by VSNU, can therefore not only be interpreted as a sign of ‘sheer 
aggravation’ but also as an attempt to develop an information system with more 
intense incentives to register data on research projects and eventually, to expose 
activities, nationally and internationally (a goal that is adhered to by many if not all 
participating institutes).  
It is noteworthy to emphasize here that the crucial difference between the NOD and 
the OIS/OZIS system was not so much the technology nor the level of standardization 
as such (the CombiFormat data model of course was a de facto standard). More likely, 
the difference has to be sought in the dispersion of property rights. In the OIS/OZIS 
information systems, participating institutes were explicitly granted the right to 
eventually adapt the data model to local needs, and, to ultimately be able to exclude 
others from access to the data bases should there be suspicion of power abuse. Given 
the fact that the participating institutes were granted a high level of autonomy, the 
OIS/OZIS information systems provided them with far more intensive incentives to 
perform well on their maintenance of registration of research projects than the 
centralized NOD system did.  
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Following the lines of reasoning of political organization theory and economic 
organization theory, we have presented a conceptual framework of the exchange of 
information through interorganizational information systems. In this framework, 
avoidance of excessive resource dependence, incentives, underinvestment and 
unintended surveillance and control play an important role as ingredients of the 
decision-making process with respect to the ownership structure of the 
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interorganizational information system. Furthermore, a hypothesis was formulated 
regarding the expected ownership structure to follow out of the decision-making 
process (in the specific conditions of no indispensable and no complementary 
information assets).  
The case study illustrated the indeed very political and adversarial decision-making 
process with respect to an interorganizational information systems in the Dutch 
research community. In the decision making process, the influences of the notions of 
incentives, underinvestment and attempts to avoid surveillance and control were 
observable. Furthermore, the study showed how a first attempt to develop an 
interorganizational information system (that is, the NOD system) failed because its 
ownership structure did not match the characteristics of the network of organizations 
(in terms of autonomy of the participating institutes, incentives, et cetera). An 
initiative to set up an (initially competing) information system with a more 
decentralized structure (CombiFormat), however, eventually replaced the NOD as the 
interorganizational information system to be used in the research community to record 
and exchange information on research endeavors.  
The study therefore illustrates how important power, surveillance and control, 
incentives, and property rights are in the development of interorganizational 
information systems. It is noticeable that the initially envisaged, integrated NOD 
system owned by NIWI in fact did not pass the evolutionary filter of efficiency and 
legitimacy in the network of organization and was replaced by an information system 
that was roughly based on the same kind of technology in terms of database 
technology, communication facilities, et cetera but yet had a completely different 
ownership structure. This supports the idea that ownership structure and the 
behavioral consequences of ownership are more important in explaining the success 
of an interorganizational information system than purely technical variables (like 
technical performance) do, and, support the hypothesis mentioned in our summary of 
the line of reasoning of economic and political organization theory.  
Furthermore, it is noticeable that from the theoretical framework and from the case 
data, it shows how poor data quality is a result of lack of incentives and in fact 
underinvestment in technical and human capabilities to keep the interorganizational 
information system viable, and that this can be mitigated by attributing property rights 
to the users of the system. This line of reasoning contradicts the sometimes-heard 
recommendation that poor data quality is best encountered by enforcing uniform data 
standards.   
From this article, it seems there is little support for the intuitively logic indicating that 
a maximum level of informational integration across organizational boundaries is 
preferable from a management point of view. Although some participants in the 
network of research institutes saw the CombiFormat initiative as a sign of sheer 
aggravation, its emergence is perfectly understandable bearing the conceptual 
framework in mind. In fact, a line of reasoning encompassing economic ánd political 
aspects assumes prominence not only in the case description as a whole, but also by 
the anecdotal empirical evidence briefly mentioned in this article. Of course, it should 
be stressed that the particular strategies employed by the organizations and actors in 
the network described in the case study are not suggested to be the most common or 
important ones more generally. Still, these strategies were encompassed in the 
framework and may well arise in comparable situations.  
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[[Figure 1: Political Economy Framework]] 
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